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The writer is chair of Rockefeller International. His new book is ‘What Went Wrong With Capitalism’
本文作者是洛克菲勒国际(Rockefeller International)董事长。他的新书是《资本主义出了什么问题》(What Went Wrong With Capitalism)
A widening transatlantic gap is inspiring glee in the US and angst in Europe. Though their per capita income levels were similar a couple of decades ago, growth (in constant dollars) has been twice as fast since 2010 in the US than in the UK and the EU’s Big 4 economies — Germany, France, Italy and Spain.
大西洋两岸日益扩大的差距令美国欢欣鼓舞，却令欧洲烦忧。尽管两地的人均收入水平与几十年前差不多，但自2010年以来，美国的增长速度（以不变美元计算）是英国和欧盟四大经济体——德国、法国、意大利和西班牙——的两倍。
Why is Europe falling behind? Look at the role of government. While over time governments have extended their control over most capitalist economies, they have expanded most markedly in Europe. Until the 1980s, government spending was lower on average in the UK and the EU Big 4 than in the US. Now Europe spends far more. The burdens of an oversized state have crushed productivity growth, which is the key to rising prosperity. From 1960s postwar peaks, I calculate that productivity growth has collapsed from almost 7 per cent to less than zero in the EU Big 4. It has fallen in the US too but less drastically, dropping from 2.5 per cent to around 1 per cent, possibly due to superior tech prowess.
为什么欧洲落后了？看看政府的角色。随着时间的推移，政府扩大了对大多数资本主义经济体的控制，但在欧洲扩张得最为明显。直到上世纪80年代，英国和欧盟四大经济体的政府支出仍平均低于美国。而现在，欧洲的支出却多得多。超大规模国家的负担压制了生产率增长，而生产率增长是经济繁荣的关键。根据我的计算，从战后60年代的峰值来看，欧盟四大经济体的生产率增长率已从近7%暴跌至不足零。美国的这一比例也有所下降，但幅度较小，从2.5%降至1%左右，这可能是由于其科技实力的优势。
Records for the UK begin earlier than most. Going back to the 1690s, the UK never ran a peacetime deficit until the 1970s. It then ran a deficit in all but five of the next 50 years. The Reagan-Thatcher “revolution” of the 1980s changed only the way the state funds its expansion, by borrowing not taxing. Public debts have risen threefold in the UK and the EU Big 4 to around 100 per cent of GDP on average.
英国的记录开始得比大多数国家都早。追溯到17世纪90年代，英国在上世纪70年代之前从未出现过和平时期的赤字。然而，在那之后的50年里，除了其中5年，它一直处于赤字状态。上世纪80年代的里根-撒切尔(Reagan-Thatcher)“革命”只改变了国家为其扩张提供资金的方式，即通过借贷而不是征税。英国和欧盟四大经济体的公共债务增长了两倍，平均达到国内生产总值(GDP)的100%左右。
More government spending left less room for private competition and initiative, particularly as central banks joined governments in a campaign to eliminate business cycles. Central bank purchases of bonds and other assets exploded from near zero in the downturns of the early 2000s to record heights in 2020, reaching 16 per cent of GDP in the US and 22 per cent in the EU Big 4.
越来越多的政府支出减少了私人竞争和主动性的空间，特别是当央行和政府一道消除商业周期的运动时。各国央行购买债券及其它资产的规模，从本世纪初经济低迷时期的接近零，激增至2020年的创纪录高点，在美国达到GDP的16%，在欧盟四大经济体达到22%。
As the “cleansing effect” of recessions faded, incumbents thrived. Corporate profits rose in part on oligopoly pricing power. Since 2000, sales in most industries have been concentrating in the largest firms — though on this front less rapidly in Europe than the US.
随着经济衰退的“清洗效应”逐渐消退，老牌企业开始蓬勃发展。企业利润的增长部分得益于寡头垄断的定价权。自2000年以来，大多数行业的销售一直集中在最大的公司身上——不过，欧洲在这方面的速度不如美国快。
Markets increasingly distorted by easy money and state bailouts also spawned “zombies” — firms that don’t earn enough to cover even interest payments on their debt. Rare before the 1980s, the latest data show zombies account for at least 10 per cent of public companies in developed markets — up to 20 per cent in the US and 22 per cent in the UK.
因宽松货币政策和国家救助而日益扭曲的市场也催生了“僵尸”——那些收入甚至不足以支付债务利息的公司。最新数据显示，在发达市场，僵尸企业至少占上市公司的10%——在美国和英国分别高达20%和22%，而这在上世纪80年代之前是罕见的。
In part because it lacks spending authority, the “Eurocracy” channelled its energies into what has been described as a “global regulatory hegemon”. Any company with ambitions in Europe must meet standards set by the most powerful states, Germany and France, on everything from carbon emissions to milk production.
在某种程度上，由于缺乏支出权限，“欧盟行政体系”(Eurocracy)将其精力投入到所谓的“全球监管霸权”中。在欧洲有野心的任何公司都必须达到德国和法国这两个最强大国家设定的从碳排放到牛奶生产的标准。
Since the super-rich own the lion’s share of financial assets, they gain most when the state rushes in to stop even minor market tremors
由于超级富豪拥有最大份额的金融资产，当政府出手阻止哪怕是轻微的市场波动时，他们的收益也是最大的
Facing both continental and national bureaucracies, it’s no surprise Europeans are more likely than Americans to cite regulation as a major obstacle to starting or expanding businesses. Many medium-sized German companies say they are considering shutting down, citing “too much red tape and higher taxes”. Many French firms dare not grow, lest they face costly rules that apply to firms with more than 50 employees.
面对大陆和国家官僚机构，欧洲人比美国人更有可能将监管视为创业或扩张企业的主要障碍，这并不奇怪。许多中型德国企业表示，它们正考虑关闭，理由是“繁文缛节太多，税收更高”。许多法国公司不敢发展，唯恐面对那些适用于雇员超过50人的公司的昂贵规则。
Heavy regulation creates a business environment that is friendly to mega firms with the most money and lawyers. Until the pandemic hit, start-ups were shrinking as a share of all companies in many industrial countries, including the UK, Spain and Italy.
严格的监管创造了一个对拥有最多资金和律师的大公司友好的商业环境。在疫情爆发之前，在包括英国、西班牙和意大利在内的许多工业国家，初创企业在所有公司中所占的比例一直在下降。
By favouring giant companies, governments boost the wealth of corporate founders, including entrenched billionaires. Since the super-rich own the lion’s share of financial assets, they gain most when the state rushes in to stop even minor market tremors. In recent decades billionaire wealth grew faster as a share of GDP in the UK and the EU Big 4 than the US. France now has both an unusually bloated government, with spending equal to 58 per cent of GDP, and an unusually dominant billionaire class whose total wealth is equal to 22 per cent of GDP, ahead of even the US.
政府通过支持大公司，增加了企业创始人的财富，其中包括根深蒂固的亿万富翁。由于超级富豪拥有最大份额的金融资产，当政府出手阻止哪怕是轻微的市场波动时，他们的收益也是最大的。近几十年来，亿万富翁财富占英国和欧盟四大经济体GDP比重的增长速度快于美国。法国现在既有异常臃肿的政府——支出相当于GDP的58%，也有异常占主导地位的亿万富翁阶层——其总财富相当于GDP的22%，甚至超过了美国。
That helps to illuminate the transatlantic gap. Add up productivity losses from oligopolies, zombies, bureaucracy, inequality and other market distortions fuelled by big government, and together they could explain the productivity slowdown. The burdens of big government are outweighing the boost from new technologies, particularly in Europe and the UK.
这有助于说明大西洋两岸的差距。把寡头垄断、僵尸、官僚主义、不平等和其他由大政府推动的市场扭曲造成的生产率损失加在一起，就可以解释生产率放缓了。大政府带来的负担超过了新技术带来的推动，在欧盟和英国尤其如此。
The twist is that US President Joe Biden has turbocharged the long expansion in American spending, debt and regulation. The country’s deficit, typical for a western nation until recently, is expected to average upwards of 6 per cent of GDP — much higher than the UK and the EU Big 4 — in coming years. Once again, the US is on track to replace Europe as the land of even bigger government — and slower growth.
转折在于，美国总统乔•拜登(Joe Biden)已经加速了美国在支出、债务和监管方面的长期扩张。预计未来几年，该国的赤字——直到不久前，仍是西方国家的典型赤字——平均将占GDP的6%以上，远高于英国和欧盟四大经济体。美国将再次取代欧洲，成为政府规模更大、增长速度更慢的国家。