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The writer is chief executive and chief investment officer of Richard Bernstein Advisors
本文作者是 Richard Bernstein Advisors首席执行官兼首席投资官
No economic model would have predicted stocks would be at all-time highs and credit spreads would be very narrow after the Federal Reserve raised its benchmark interest rate by 5.25 percentage points since early 2022. Yet, that is exactly what has happened.
在美联储(Federal Reserve)自2022年初以来将基准利率上调5.25个百分点之后，没有任何经济模型会预测到股市会处于历史高位，信贷息差会非常窄。然而，这确实发生了。
The Fed seems ready to declare victory in its fight against inflation, but the outperformance of highly speculative investments suggests that even such a sharp increase in interest rates hasn’t been a big enough mop to soak up the excess liquidity sloshing around the financial markets.
美联储似乎已经准备好宣布抗击通胀的胜利，但高度投机性投资的优异表现表明，即使是如此大幅度的加息，也不足以吸干金融市场上过剩的流动性。
Central banks still don’t seem to understand that financial bubbles are sources of future real asset inflation. Bubbles misallocate capital within an economy to unneeded assets (cryptocurrencies and meme stocks, perhaps?). And capital doesn’t flow to productivity-enhancing investment. Indeed, the US consumer price index finally peaked at 5.6 per cent subsequent to the technology bubble in 2008.
各国央行似乎仍不明白，金融泡沫是未来实际资产通胀的根源。泡沫会将经济中的资本错误地分配到不需要的资产上——也许是加密货币和网红股？——资本不会流向提高生产力的投资。事实上，在2008年科技泡沫之后，美国消费者价格指数最终达到了5.6%的峰值。
There is evidence that speculation could again be curtailing the Fed’s inflation-fighting power, but the central bank seems blind to this. Investors shouldn’t be.
有证据表明，投机可能会再次削弱美联储对抗通胀的能力，但央行似乎对此视而不见。投资者不应该如此。
Historically, the performance of higher and lower quality has been consistent across asset classes. Smaller capitalisation stocks’ relative performance versus larger stocks tends to mimic credit spreads — the interest rate corporates pay over benchmark levels. That is because smaller, lower-quality companies have greater operating and financial leverage and are more influenced by the economic and profit cycles.
从历史上看，优质和劣质资产在不同资产类别中的表现是一致的。小盘股票相对于大盘股票的表现往往与信贷息差——企业支付的利率高于基准水平——相似。这是因为规模较小、质量较低的公司具有更大的经营和财务杠杆，受经济和利润周期的影响更大。
In other words, small cap stocks tend to outperform large caps and credit spreads tighten when corporate profits improve, but large caps tend to outperform and credit spreads widen when profits deteriorate.
换句话说，当企业利润改善时，小盘股的表现往往优于大盘股，信贷息差也会收窄；但当利润恶化时，大盘股的表现往往优于小盘股，信贷息差也会扩大。
Speculation over the past two years has significantly distorted this long-standing inter-market quality relationship. Large cap stocks have outperformed small cap stocks despite profits accelerating and credit spreads tightening. This has been primarily driven by the so-called Magnificent Seven tech stocks — Apple, Microsoft, Meta, Amazon, Alphabet, Nvidia and Tesla. The result has been a narrow market leadership and an emphasis on higher-quality stocks. Fixed-income performance, however, has been broader, and more cyclical with lower-quality credit benefiting.
过去两年的投机行为严重扭曲了这种长期存在的市场间质量关系。尽管利润加速增长，信贷息差收窄，但大盘股的表现却优于小盘股。这主要是由所谓的七大科技股——苹果、微软、Meta、亚马逊、Alphabet、Nvidia和特斯拉——推动的。其结果是，市场领先优势缩小，优质股票受到重视。而固定收益的表现则更为广泛，且更具周期性，低质量信贷从中受益。
This extreme divergence suggests three possible outcomes. First, the Magnificent Seven’s outperformance might be ignoring the broad improvement in corporate cash flows, whereas narrow credit spreads are correctly accounting for the cyclical upturn. This seems reasonable because the US profits cycle is accelerating and roughly 160 S&P 500 companies now have earnings growth of 25 per cent or more.
这种极端的差异表明了三种可能的结果。首先，“七巨头”的优异表现可能忽视了企业现金流的广泛改善，而狭窄的信贷息差则正确地反映了周期性的好转。这似乎是合理的，因为美国的盈利周期正在加速，目前大约有160家标准普尔500指数公司的盈利增长达到25%以上。
A second scenario could be that the equity market’s extremely narrow leadership is justified because an apocalyptic credit event is lurking. Goldman Sachs has pointed out the 1930s was the last time equity market leadership was as narrow as it is today.
第二种情况可能是，股市的微弱领先是合理的，因为一场灾难性的信贷事件正在潜伏。高盛指出，上一次股票市场的领导地位像今天这样狭窄是在上世纪30年代。
Narrow leadership makes economic sense during a depression because companies are struggling to survive let alone grow. Today’s narrow leadership, however, is accompanied by accelerating corporate earnings and a healthy banking system. Thus, a significant credit event of the magnitude that would justify such narrow equity market leadership seems unlikely.
在经济萧条时期，微弱的领先在经济上是合理的，因为公司正在为生存而挣扎，更不用说增长了。然而，今天的窄幅领先伴随着企业盈利的加速和银行系统的健康。因此，似乎不太可能发生能够证明这种股市微弱领先地位的重大信贷事件。
A third scenario could be that excess liquidity is fuelling speculation in both the equity and the fixed-income markets, and that neither the Magnificent Seven’s outperformance nor the tight credit spreads are appropriate. There’s certainly evidence of speculation in both markets. If this scenario is the appropriate interpretation, then equity market segments not typically defensive, such as emerging markets and smaller caps, might prove to be havens should the volatility of the current stock market leaders increase.
第三种情况可能是，流动性过剩助长了股市和固定收益市场的投机行为，“七巨头”的优异表现和信贷息差的紧缩都是不恰当的。当然，有证据表明这两个市场都存在投机行为。如果这种解释是正确的，那么如果当前股市领头羊的波动加剧，新兴市场和小盘股等通常不具有防御性的股市板块可能会成为避风港。
Although odd, there is a precedent for this. When the technology bubble began to deflate in March 2000, the overall stock market began the “lost decade” during which the S&P 500 had a modest negative annualised return for 10 years, but energy stocks, commodities, emerging markets, and smaller caps performed extremely well.
虽然奇怪，但这是有先例可循的。2000年3月，科技股泡沫开始破灭，整个股市开始了“失去的十年”，在这十年中，标准普尔500指数的年化收益率为小幅负值，但能源股、大宗商品、新兴市场和小盘股的表现却极为出色。
From March 2000 to March 2010, the S&P 500’s annualised total return was negative 0.7 per cent a year and the S&P 500 Technology sector was down 8.0 per cent a year. However, the S&P 500 Energy sector was up 9.4 per cent a year, the S&P Small Cap Index was up 6.6 per cent a year, and MSCI Emerging Market Index was up 10.0 per cent a year.
从2000年3月到2010年3月，标普500指数的年化总回报率为每年负0.7%，标普500指数科技板块每年下跌8.0%。然而，标普500能源板块每年上涨9.4%，标普小型股指数每年上涨6.6%，MSCI新兴市场指数每年上涨10.0%。
Those segments benefited from the reallocation of capital away from technology stocks, but also from post-bubble inflation spurring their profits. The Fed’s past could be the prologue. Capital is again being misallocated within the economy, yet the Fed still doesn’t seem to appreciate that misallocated capital kindles future inflation.
这些部门受益于资本从科技股的重新配置，也受益于泡沫后通胀刺激的利润。美联储的过去可能就是序幕。资本再次在经济中被错误配置，但美联储似乎仍未意识到错误配置的资本会引发未来的通货膨胀。